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SECTIONS
Paradox... Oversights
Real Number Theory Paradoxes
Set Theory Paradoxes
General Introduction to Paradox in Modern
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Paradox... Oversights
(If you like you can peruse a General Introduction to Paradox in Modern
Math before proceeding.)
Set Theory stands out
for having “paradox”
built into its foundations, especially since the heretofore overlooked paradoxes
that can be found there seem to underlie paradoxes throughout mathematics, both
older paradoxes thought to have been resolved satisfactorily, and new paradoxes,
as yet unrecognized as such and unevaluated not to mention “unresolved” by the community.
But
Real Number Theory,
too, has many
interesting new paradoxes that are well worth examining, many of which can be
linked back to Set Theory. And there are many other paradoxes hard
to classify as to whether they properly lie in Measure Theory, Real
Number Theory, Set Theory, or whatever.
Mathematics has many paradoxes in its foundations that have
been overlooked for more than a century, paradoxes that have not yet been
publicly recognized, perhaps because of cognitive dissonance. That is, these
paradoxes may
be too paradoxical. They get too close to what people will accept as
mathematical inconsistency of the unacceptable
kind... eventually.
Paradox has been popular since ancient times, but... not
always popular in the best sense of the word. The ancient Greek philosophers
known as Sophists presented the community with paradoxes that showed that the
abstract reasoning that the Greeks had come to pride themselves on was fatally flawed.
Many Sophists were actually put to death for doing so, much like Socrates, by
the Inquisition of that day. Unfortunately the spirit of the Inquisition is
still with us, though we notice it more in places like the Middle East.
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SECTIONS
Paradox... Oversights
Real Number Theory Paradoxes
Set Theory Paradoxes
General Introduction to Paradox in Modern
Math |
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Set Theory Paradoxes
Set Theory has paradoxes that have not yet been
officially recognized. They seem to almost all derive from the
Bijection Permutation Paradox
that is a consequence of Set Theory’s
use of bijections from transfinite sets onto proper subsets of them selves.
(See an entertainingly informal account in
The Good Shepherd’s Paradox.)
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839‑1914), and later
(but much more famously) Julius Wilhelm Richard Dedekind (1831‑1916), suggested
that the existence of a bijection of a set with a proper subset was in fact
definitional of transfinite sets, and this is now accepted as standardly
fundamental. The reason this is considered to be paradoxical is that the sets
are held to have “the same number of elements”,
i.e. “the same cardinality”, even
though set subtraction yields a non-empty set. But it has been overlooked that
it is easy to derive, from the standard axioms and rules of inference of set
theory, a bijection counterpart to set subtraction, specifically for the
“bijections” from sets onto proper subsets of themselves that are fundamental to
transfinite counting and arithmetic. I.e. we find the
Bijection Permutation Paradox that a bijection
must formally exist between a non-empty set and the empty set.
And even mathematics greats like
Bertrand
Russell and Ernst Zermelo
made significant oversights, Russell in his
Russell’s
Paradox (see
Russell’s Great... Oversights),
and Zermelo with regard to his
Axiom of Separation, a
paradox that we have given the name of
“Axiom
of Separation
Paradox”
(see
Zermelo’s
Great... Oversight).
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General Introduction to Paradox in Modern
Math
The set theory developed by Georg Ferdinand Ludwig
Philip Cantor (1845-1918) has been paradoxical since its inception. In
fact, with the acceptance of Cantor’s set
theory, paradox, which had earlier meant inconsistency in a mathematically
unacceptable sense, has come to be considered not merely acceptable, but
conventional. The acceptance by mathematicians of this marriage of paradox
and consistency in the two thirds of modern mathematics that has Cantor’s
set theory — along with logic
— as an essential part of its foundations
can be summed up in David Hilbert’s
rhetorical question: “What mathematician
would want to be expelled from the paradise which Cantor created?”
In order not to be “expelled”
, i.e. in order to avoid turning acceptable paradox into unacceptable
inconsistency, we even selectively abandon fundamental principles of
mathematics. A standard example is the avoidance of the standard
application of the standard rule of inference that equal quantities can be
subtracted from both sides of an equation to the fundamental equation of
transfinite cardinal arithmetic:
a0 + 1 = a0.
There are more.
This result — that
a0 + 1 = a0
— is often proven by means of
constructing a bijection from
Á ~ {0}
onto Á,
demonstrating that |Á ~ {0}| = |Á|
(where |S| is the cardinality of the set
S, and
Á 4 {1,2,3…}
is the set of all natural numbers, and thus the set union of
Á and {0} has 1 more element in it
than Á).
(It can be noted in passing that modernly some people have started
defining Á as
Á 4 {0,1,2,3…},
but this should not be a problem here.) Since |Á ~ {0}| = |Á| 4 a0,
and |Á ~ {0}| = |Á| + |1| = a0 + 1, the equation
a0 + 1 = a0
is considered to follow immediately. (See the section
“‘Counting’
and Cantorian ‘Reordering’”,
below, for an analysis of the ostensibly bijective mapping from
Á ~ {0} = {0,1,2,3…}
onto Á 4 {1,2,3…}.)
In the face of
a0 + 1 = a0,
since the theorem 1 = 0 would be considered not merely paradox but
inconsistency (unacceptable since e.g. all natural numbers would become
equal), we back off from the usual definition of a mathematical theory
being all the theorems that can possibly be derived from the axioms
and rules of inference, and from the usual definition of the inconsistency
of a theory being the possibility of formally deriving both a
theorem and its negation from those same axioms and rules of inference.
Relatedly, we also back off from the fundamental principle of always being
able to replace a defined/constructed entity/symbol by its initial
definition/construction. E.g. once we define/construct transfinite
arithmetic from finite arithmetic, we allow proofs using a “simultaneous”
mapping from n to
n + 1 for all natural numbers
n in
Á 4 {1,2,3…}
without further reference to the serial definition/construction of the
natural numbers, and we get very different results.
With regard to the fundamental theorem of set theory
that
a0 + 1 = a0
we have selectively, in a dubious context sensitive fashion, deliberately
failed to apply a standard rule of inference merely because it would yield
a standard inconsistency (in a theory not noted for its
paraconsistency). We can speak of hidden “Rules
of Deference” in such situations, where
we quasi-formally refrain from performing a standard derivation, e.g.
applying a standard rule of inference, which derivation/application, by
definition of a mathematical “theory”,
gives us a valid theorem of the theory, and gives us a contradiction if
and only if the theory is inconsistent. Any mathematical theory
will be “consistent” if we proceed on
such a basis.
Paradox in set theory is usually associated with the
Axiom of Choice, the use of which seems to lead to rather more paradox
than many mathematicians are comfortable with. But, in fact, unacceptable
paradox in set theory will be seen to derive from the Continuum
Hypothesis, or rather from the fundamentals that give rise to it. It is
the assumption (ostensibly proven) that transfinite sets can be bijected
with proper subsets of themselves that leads visibly to the Continuum
Hypothesis, and invisibly to “problematic”
paradox.
Besides “paradoxes”
(such as above) that are known but not yet adequately appreciated, there
are many new paradoxes that are as yet unrecognized in set theory and
related theories such as real number theory. These paradoxes, some of
which will be studied in later sections, also suggest that a new,
non-classical kind of
non-Cantorian set theory is needed for transfinite sets and their
arithmetic, at least one that satisfactorily resolves all known paradoxes,
especially the more embarrassing ones, in particular the new ones
presented in this paper.
“Non-Cantorian set theory”
(see
definition) has classically been defined, with great lack of imagination concerning the
entire range of possibilities, as an otherwise standard set theory that
axiomatically rejects (as opposed to deriving a falsification of) the
Continuum Hypothesis, which has so far seemed to be an independent axiom
(e.g. Gödel and Cohen). However the Continuum Hypothesis will be found to
be not only falsifiable, but provably false (see Theorem 12), and a new
set theory will be needed that more than just rejects it, or even
falsifies it. An alternative to the Continuum Hypothesis, a
“Quantinuum Hypothesis”, will be seen to
derive naturally from all this, and to suggest paradigms for a new theory.
The desirability of developing a Quantinuum Hypothesis
and a new and non-standardly
non-Cantorian set theory (or theories) will
be proposed in this paper, but in the sense of necessity, not just in the
sense of the explorations of new systems for their own sake as with
non-Euclidean geometries. A new theory is needed with a whole new concept
of infinity or “transfinity”, one from which e.g.
“quantinuous” infinitesimals/“transfinitesimals”
derive naturally. An example of a possible benefit of such a new non-Cantorian
theory is that it might offer a resolution to the problem of
renormalization that we find in e.g. quantum mechanics, where, related to
the
a0 + 1 = a0
paradox, infinite quantities are subtracted —
with a hope and a prayer — from both
sides of various equations to get equations of finite quantities that are
theoretically useful.
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